Pacman has multiple ways to verify package content integrity:
- gpg signature
- sha256
- md5
These verification mechanisms overlap each other. gpg signatures already contain
hash value of the package content. So if a package signature is present then
pacman ignored the other 2 hash values. This worked well with signtures
embedded into pacman database.
Recently pacman got an ability to handle detached signatures (*.sig files
located next to the package files). If pacman verifies detached signature only
then one can replace pkg+sig files with some other content and pacman still
processes it as a valid package. To prevent it we need to verify
database<->package integrity using hash values stored in the database.
This commit fixes FS#67232
The new debug output is:
checking package integrity...
debug: found cached pkg: /var/cache/pacman/pkg/ruby-2.7.1-2-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst
debug: sha256sum: 77baf61c62c5570b3a37cf0c3b16c5d9a97dde6fedd1a3528bf0cc5f96dd5e52
debug: checking sha256sum for /var/cache/pacman/pkg/ruby-2.7.1-2-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst
debug: sig data: <from .sig>
debug: checking signature for /var/cache/pacman/pkg/ruby-2.7.1-2-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst
debug: 1 signatures returned
debug: fingerprint: B5971F2C5C10A9A08C60030F786C63F330D7CB92
Signed-off-by: Anatol Pomozov <anatol.pomozov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Allan McRae <allan@archlinux.org>
f53ac85ff6